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Napster: Facilitation of Sharing, or Contributory and
Vicarious Copyright Infringement?
Sue Ann Mota*
INTRODUCTION
From childhood, we are taught to share. But may we
share, peer-to-peer, copyrighted music through Napster.com?
Record companies argue that Napster users are direct
1
copyright infringers, and that Napster itself is a vicarious and
2
contributory copyright infringer. The Court of Appeals for the
3
Ninth Circuit agreed on February 12, 2001, and on March 5,
2001 Napster was preliminarily enjoined from “engaging in, or
facilitating others in, copying, downloading, uploading,
4
transmitting, or distributing” copyrighted sound recordings.
The March 5, 2001 injunction further ordered Napster to
prevent the downloading, uploading, transmitting, or
distributing copyrighted sound recordings within three
5
business days of receipt of reasonable notice of infringing files.
This article will examine the Napster litigation through
the March 5, 2001 preliminary injunction. The article will
conclude with implications for other file-sharing and data
transmission technologies.

*
Professor of Legal Studies, Department of Legal Studies and
International Business, Bowling Green State University; J.D., University of
Toledo College of Law, Order of the Coif; M.A. and B.A., Bowling Green State
University.
1. See Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees at 25, A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-16401, 00-16403).
2. See id.
3. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir.
2001). See infra notes 32-68 and accompanying text.
4. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C99-05183 MHP, MDL, No.
C00-1369 MHP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 5, 2001).
See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
5. See Napster, 2001 U.S Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *7.
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A & M RECORDS, INCORPORATED V. NAPSTER, INCORPORATED
Napster, “the brainchild of a college student who wanted to
6
facilitate music-swapping by his roommate,” began operations
7
on June 1, 1999. Napster, an Internet start-up, distributes its
proprietary file sharing software, MusicShare, free at its Web
site, and users then log on to Napster and share MP3 music
8
files with other users. Napster users use this peer-to-peer file
sharing system to upload and download MP3 files without
payment to Napster, each other, or copyright owners.
Napster did not obtain licenses to distribute, download, or
9
Napster claims that it had a
facilitate others to do so.
10
copyright compliance policy as early as October 1999, but
admits that it did not document or notify users of this policy
11
Napster is a free service, and
until February 7, 2000.
according to plaintiffs, virtually all Napster users download or
12
upload some copyrighted files, according to plaintiffs.
According to an expert for the plaintiffs, 87% of Napster files
exchanged belong to a copyright holder, and over seventy
13
percent are copyrighted and owned by the plaintiffs.
On December 6, 1999, plaintiffs, eighteen copyright holders
including A & M Records, MCA Records, Sony Music

6. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
7. See Spencer E. Ante, Inside Napster, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 14, 2000,
at 113.
8. See Napster, 114 F. Supp.2d at 901. MP3 Expert or Motion Picture
Group 1, Audio Layer 3, is a standard format to store compressed audio files.
See id. MP3 is an algorithm that compresses a digital music file by a ratio of
approximately 12:1, thereby reducing the size of the file so that it can be more
easily and quickly copied, transmitted and downloaded over the Internet. See
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1747 n.1
(N.D. Cal. 2000). See generally Recording Indus. Ass’n. of Am. v. Diamond
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999).
9. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 903.
10. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748. This policy reads as
follows:
Napster will terminate the accounts of users who are repeat
infringers of the copyrights, or other intellectual property rights, of
others. In addition, Napster reserves the right to terminate the
account of a user upon any single infringement of the rights of others
in conjunction with use of the Napster service.
Id.
11. See id.
12. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902-03.
13. Id. at 903.

2001]

NAPSTER: FACILITATION OF SHARING?

63

Entertainment, Atlantic Recording Corporation, Capitol
Records, and other leading manufacturers and distributors of
sound recordings, filed a complaint against Napster for
14
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. Some
plaintiffs also alleged related violations of the California Civil
15
16
According to the plaintiffs,
Code and unfair competition.
Napster is an online bazaar devoted to the piracy of music, and
is created and is operating a haven for music on an
17
For the alleged contributory and
unprecedented scale.
vicarious copyright infringements, the plaintiffs requested
18
damages and profits, or statutory damages of $100,000 for
19
each work infringed.
The plaintiffs also requested
preliminary and permanent injunctions against further
20
contributory and vicarious infringements.
21
Napster requested summary adjudication, claiming that
its activities fell within the safe harbor provision of the Digital
22
The district court
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
declined to grant the motion for summary adjudication,
however, ruling that Napster did not qualify for the safe harbor
because it did not transmit, route, or provide connections
23
through its service. Even if Napster had met these conditions,
however, the safe harbor provisions require a service provider
to have a policy to terminate subscribers who are repeat

14. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1747 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(including Counts I and II of the complaint which cite violations of 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106, 115, and 501 (1999)); 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 115 (a), (d), and 501 (a). See
infra note 47 and accompanying text (describing contributory copyright
infringement) and note 46 and accompanying text (describing vicarious
copyright infringement).
15. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747 (describing Count III of the
complaint which cites California Civil Code § 980 (a) (2)).
16. See id. (describing Count IV of the complaint which cites California
Business and Professions Code § 17200).
17. See id. at ¶ 1.
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2001).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2001). At the time the complaint was filed, §
504 (c)(2)’s limit was $100,000. It was amended to increase to $150,000 by the
Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-160, § 2, 113 Stat. 1774 (1999).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2001) (authorizing injunctions).
21. Summary adjudication may be granted under the same standards as
summary judgment. Summary judgment shall be granted when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1748.
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2001); Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1748-49.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2) (2001); Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1752.
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24

infringers. Napster did not give users notice of such a written
25
policy until two months after this suit was filed.
On July 26, 2000, District Court Judge Marilyn Patel held
a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction,
and on that day granted the preliminary injunction and
ordered Napster to comply with the order by midnight, July 28,
26
2000. The district court preliminarily enjoined Napster “from
engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading,
uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs’ copyrighted
musical compositions and sound recordings, protected by either
federal or state law, without express permission of the rights
27
owner.” In the district court’s findings of fact, the court found
that Napster use was likely to reduce CD purchases by college
28
students, heavy users of Napster. In the findings of law, the
judge did not allow Napster to expand the fair use doctrine to
29
On July 28, however, the Court of
protect its activities.
30
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2001).
25. See Napster, 54 U.S.P.Q.D.2d at 1752; supra notes 10-11 and
accompanying text.
26. See Napster, 114 F. Supp.2d at 927 n.32. The plaintiffs argued that
they were likely to succeed on the merits, as Napster was liable for
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement and argued that Napster’s
defenses were meritless. The plaintiffs stated that absent an injunction, they
would suffer substantial and irreparable harm, and an injunction would serve
the public interest. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, A & M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc. (No. C-99-5183 MHP).
27. Id. at 927.
28. See id. at 909.
29. See id at 901. The statute provides the following non-exhaustive list
of fair use factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. §107 (2001).
Under the first factor, the court found that the purpose and character
of the use militates against fair use, and the use was not private. See Napster,
114 F. Supp. 2d at 912-13. The nature of the use went against the finding of
fair use under the second factor. See id. Under the third factor, the entire
copyrighted work was copied. See id. The fourth factor also weighed against a
fair use since CD sales to college students were reduced and barriers to
plaintiffs’ entry into the market for digital downloading were raised. See id.
Thus, a fair use was not present. See id.
30. See id. at 927 n.32. On July 28, 2000, the plaintiffs posted a bond for
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On October 11, 2000, five actions against Napster were
centralized in the district court for the Northern District of
31
California.
On Feb. 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the recording companies substantially and
primarily prevailed on appeal, and partially remanded the case
32
to the district court to modify the preliminary injunction. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the district court
used appropriate legal standards when issuing the preliminary
injunction and whether the district court applied the law
correctly to the underlying issues of the case, or whether “the
33
district court got the law right.”
Because Napster could not commit vicarious or
contributory copyright infringement without direct copyright
34
infringement by a third party, the appeals court stated that
“[p]laintiffs must satisfy two requirements to present a prima
facie case of direct infringement: (1) they must show ownership
of the allegedly infringed material and (2) they must
demonstrate that the alleged infringers violate at least one
35
The district
exclusive right granted to copyright holders.”
court concluded that the plaintiffs made a prima facie case of
direct infringement by Napster users, under 17 U.S.C. § 106,
36
Napster claimed,
and this was not appealed by Napster.
however, that its users had a fair use defense to direct
37
copyright infringement. A Napster user’s fair uses included
sampling, or making temporary copies of a work before
purchasing it; space-shifting, or accessing a work through
Napster that the user already owns; and distributing
38
recordings by artists who allow users to access the work. The
five million dollars to compensate Napster for losses if the injunction was
reversed or vacated. See id.
31. In re Napster, No. 1369, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15493, at *1 (J.P.M.L.
Oct. 11, 2000) (listing the actions).
32. See Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1029.
33. Id. at *12. “Preliminary injunctive relief is available to a party who
demonstrates either: (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and
the possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) that serious questions are raised and
the balance of hardships tips in its favor.” Id. (citing Prudential Real Estate
Affiliates, Inc. v. PPR Realty, Inc., 204 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 2000)).
34. See id. at 1013 n.2 (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Net Com On-line
Communication Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
35. Id. at 1013.
36. Id. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
37. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. See supra note 29.
38. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. See generally, Ruth Okediji, Givers,

66

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 2:61

Ninth Circuit stated that the district court correctly
determined that the plaintiffs would likely prevail in
establishing that both sampling and space-shifting are not fair
39
uses. Sampling is a commercial use that adversely affects the
40
markets for both audio CD’s and online distribution.
Similarly, the district court did not err in finding that the
plaintiffs would likely prevail in establishing that space41
When a user lists a copy of a
shifting is not a fair use.
recording that he or she owns on the Napster system so that
the recording can be accessed from another location, that
42
recoding becomes available to millions of other users. Finally,
permissive distribution of works, along with other
noninfringing uses of Napster such as chat rooms and message
boards, were not challenged by the plaintiffs on appeal. Having
found no error by the district court on the fair use issue, the
Ninth Circuit addressed Napster’s secondary liability for its
users’ direct infringement.
Contributory copyright infringement occurs when one
induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing
Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA.
L. REV. 107 (2001); Wendy M. Pollack, Note, Tuning In: The Future of
Copyright Protection for Online Music in the Digital Millennium, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2445 (2000).
39. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
40. See id. at 1018.
41. See id. at 1019. The district court did not err in refusing to apply the
shifting analysis of Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 423 (1984), and Recording Indus. Ass’n. of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia
Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999). In Sony, the majority of VCR
purchasers did not distribute taped television shows, but viewed them at
home. In Diamond, the users transferred a copyrighted work from their hard
drives to portable MP3 players. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019. See generally
Jayne A. Pemberton, Note, UPDATE: RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems Napster and MP3.com, 7 RICH .J.L. TECH. 1 (Fall 2000)
<http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7il/note3.html>; Stephen W. Webb, Note,
RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems; The Recording Industry Attempts to
Slow the MP3 Revolution, Taking Aim at the Jogger Friendly Diamond Rio, 7
J.L.&
TECH.
5
(Fall
2000)
RICH.
<http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v7il/note2.html>; Elizabeth R. Gosse, Note,
Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
Inc.: The RIAA Could Not Stop the Rio – MP3 Files and the Audio Home
Recording Act, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 575 (2000); Alex Alleman, Note,
Manifestation of an AHRA Malfunction: The Uncertain Status of MP3 Under
Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
Inc., 79 TEX. L. REV. 189 (2000); Lisa M. Needham, Comment, A Day in the
Life of the Digital Music Wars: The RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, 26 W.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1135 (2000).
42. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
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conduct of another, by one who knows or has reason to know of
43
the direct infringement. According to the Ninth Circuit, the
district court did not err in finding that Napster both actively
and constructively knew that its users exchanged copyrighted
44
music which was sufficient to impose contributory liability.
The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the district court properly
found that Napster materially contributed to direct
45
Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, the
infringement.
plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of
46
the contributory copyright infringement claim.
Vicarious copyright infringement, an outgrowth of
respondeat superior, extends beyond employment relationships
to instances where the defendant both has the right and ability
to supervise the infringing activity, and has a direct financial
47
interest in the infringing activities. The district court did not
err in finding that Napster had a direct financial interest in the
48
infringing activity. The Ninth Circuit also found that Napster
had the right and ability to supervise its users’ conduct and
therefore the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the
49
vicarious copyright infringement claim was proper.

43. Id. In other words, contributory infringement occurs when one
engages in personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement. See
id.
44. Id. at 1020. The district court found actual knowledge because a
document by a Napster co-founder mentioned the need to remain ignorant of
users’ real names and IP addresses since they were exchanging pirated music,
and RIAA informed Napster of more than 12,000 infringement files. The
district court found constructive knowledge because Napster executives had
the following: recording industry experience; intellectual property enforcement
experience; downloading experience involving copyrighted music; and
promotion experience of the site listing infringing files. See id. at 1020 n.5.
The appeals court did depart from the reasoning of the district court in that
the district court improperly confined the analysis of knowledge to current
users and ignored the system’s capabilities. See id. at 1021.
45. See id. at 1022.
46. See id. The district court concluded that Napster users could find and
download copyrighted music with ease and without the service that Napster
provides. Id. at 1022 n.6.
47. See id. at 1022.
48. Id. at 1023. Financial benefit exists where the availability of
infringing material acts as a draw for customers, and Napster’s revenue is
directly dependent on increases in users. Id.
49. See id. at 1023-24. Napster’s admission about that improved methods
of blocking users shows that Napster can and does supervise its service.
Napster’s own express reservation of rights policy posted on its website shows
Napster’s right to control its site. Id. at 1023.
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Napster then asserted that two statutes, the Audio Home
50
Recording Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
51
(DMCA), to protect it and preclude the issuance of a
52
preliminary injunction. Napster claimed that its users were
noncommercial users within the meaning of the Audio Home
Recording Act, so Napster itself could not be secondarily liable.
The Ninth Circuit, however, agreed with the district court that
the Audio Home Recording Act does not cover the downloading
of MP3 files to computer hard drives for two reasons.
Computers are not digital audio recording devices under the
statute, and computers do not make digital music recordings
53
defined by the statute. Napster also argued that the DMCA’s
safe harbor from copyright infringement suits for Internet
54
Plaintiffs
service providers gives it immunity from suit.
raised significant questions about the safe harbor which will be
55
more fully developed at trial, but the district court properly
concluded that ample evidence showed that the balance of
56
hardships weighed in the plaintiffs’ favor.
Napster then contended that it had the valid affirmative
defenses of waiver, implied license, and copyright misuse,
57
which had been improperly rejected by the district court.
Concerning waiver or abandonment of copyright, which occurs
only if there is an intent by the copyright owner to surrender
rights in the copyrighted work, the Ninth Circuit held that the
district court did not err in finding that the plaintiffs did not
waive any legal authority to exercise exclusive control over

50. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2001).
51. 17 USC § 512 (2001).
52. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 1025.
55. See id. The plaintiffs raised issues of whether Napster is an ISP
under the statute, whether copyright owners must give an ISP official notice of
infringing activity, and whether Napster complies with the statute that
requires an ISP to timely establish a detailed copyright policy. On the
DMCA’s safe harbor, the appeals court cited S. Rep. 105-190, at 40 (1998) and
Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious Liability
for Copyright Infringement Into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
75 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1028-30 (2000). The Wright article advocates reading
actual control into the DMCA’s safe harbor under 17 USC § 512(c) (1)(B) as
technology challenges conventional definitions of control, and the sheer
volume of transactions over a web site makes such control difficult. See id. at
1036.
56. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025.
57. See id. at 1025-26.
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58

creation and distribution of MP3 files.
Concerning the
implied license, which is found only in narrow circumstances
where one party creates a work at the other’s request and
intends the other to copy and distribute it, the appellate court
similarly held that the record supports the conclusion that
59
there is no evidence to support this defense either. Similarly,
there was no error in rejecting the affirmative defense of
copyright misuse, which prohibits a copyright owner from
securing an exclusive right not granted by the Copyright
60
Office.
Napster also argued that the preliminary injunction
violates the First Amendment because it is broader than
61
The Ninth Circuit held that the injunction was
necessary.
62
proper. The five million dollar bond posted by the plaintiffs
63
was not increased on appeal, despite requests by Napster.
The court also rejected Napster’s request for a compulsory
royalty instead of an injunction, as the Copyright Act provides
various sanctions for infringers, and would force the plaintiffs
to do business with Napster as well as lose control both over
their ability to negotiate and to control their intellectual
64
property.
The Ninth Circuit thus agreed with the district court that
a preliminary injunction against Napster was not only
65
The scope of the preliminary
warranted, but required.
66
injunction needed to be modified on remand, however. The
burden of protecting copyrighted works on Napster should be
shared by the parties. The burden should be placed on the
plaintiffs to provide notice of copyrighted files on Napster
before Napster has the duty to disable access to the copyrighted
67
material; Napster also bears the burden of policing its system.
On March 5, 2001 the district court preliminarily enjoined
Napster from engaging in, or facilitating others in, copying,
58. See id. at 1026.
59. See id.
60. See id.
The plaintiffs seek to control the exclusive rights of
reproduction and distribution, and do not seek to control rights beyond their
exclusive rights. See id. at 1027.
61. See id. at 1027-28.
62. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1028.
63. See id.; supra note 30.
64. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1028-29.
65. Id. at 1027.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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uploading, transmitting, or distributing copyrighted sound
68
recordings. When Napster receives reasonable knowledge of
specific infringing files containing copyrighted recordings,
Napster has three business days to prevent the files from being
included in the Napster index, which would prevent access to
69
these files.
CONCLUSION
Napster has been preliminarily enjoined from facilitating
copyright infringement, and copyright infringement damages
are pending. Napster, one of the largest peer-to-peer filesharing services, estimated that it had over 75 million users by
70
Napster now has three days to block
the end of 2000.
71
copyrighted music after notice is received. If a user supplies a
Counter Notification, Napster will send a copy of that Counter
Notification to the copyright right’s holder making the
allegation of infringement. Napster will restore access to the
user’s account within 10 to 14 business days thereafter, unless
during that time Napster’s Designated Copyright Agent
68. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C99-05183 MHP, MDL, No.
C00-1369 MHP, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
69. See id at 7. Plaintiffs may also provide to Napster works in advance of
release, if there is a substantial likelihood that the work will be infringed on
the Napster site. See id.
70. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
71. A notice given by Napster.com to a user who is a former student of
this author (March 9, 2001) states in pertinent part:
Notice of Blocked Access! Please read this entire notice carefully. If
you were redirected to this page by the Napster client, the reason is
because Napster has received an allegation from or on behalf of a
copyright rights holder under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”). The allegation is that material that you have made
available through the Napster service is copyrighted and that your
making it available infringes the notifier’s copyright. In response, we
have blocked you from access to your Napster account. Your account
will remain blocked unless you provide us with a completed copy of
the “Counter Notification” form below to the “Designated Copyright
Agent,” all as covered by the DMCA law. In order to submit a
counter notification, you must certify, under penalty of perjury that
you have a good faith belief that you were blocked as a result of the
notifier’s mistake or misidentification of the material you were
sharing. This form must, as you will see, include your full real name,
complete address, your Napster user name (i.e., the user name which
you were using at the time we received the notice and had to block
your account), and your consent to being sued in the federal court
where you reside by the copyright holder.

2001]

NAPSTER: FACILITATION OF SHARING?

71

receives notice from the copyright right’s holder that it has filed
a legal action against the user seeking a court order to restrain
the user from engaging in illegal activity relating to material
made available through the Napster service. This author
believes that this preliminary injunction, as modified, will help
prevent copyright infringement, yet will allow the sharing of
non-protected files.
While Napster and its partner,
Bertelsmann AG, may stay in business by licensing music for a
72
fee to its customers, other companies such as Gnutella and
73
Freenet still allow file sharing anonymously.
Servers and
companies operating offshore are also very difficult to shut
74
down. Napster has sparked new peer-to-peer applications for
the PC, and is going to spark a new breed of data transmission,
and the law is struggling to keep up with these technological
75
changes. A balance will have to be maintained between the
free sharing of ideas and public domain materials, and
intellectual property rights.

72. See Lee Gomes, Judge Starts Process of Silencing Napster, WALL ST.
J., March 5, 2001, at B6.
73. See Dennis K. Berman, With Technology Like This, Who Needs
Napster?, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 17, 2000, at 121.
74. See, Lee Gomes, “Open Napster” Clones Feel Industry Heat, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 23, 2001, at B9.
75. E-mail from Lindahl Burkhart, attorney at Jones, Day, Reavis and
Pogue, to this author (on file with author).

